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THE SCHOLAR
"Police misconduct-whether described as brutality, harassment, ver-
bal abuse or discourtesy-cannot be tolerated even if it is infrequent.
It contributes directly to the risk of civil disorder. It is inconsistent
with the basic responsibility and function of a police force in a
democracy. "1
"The mood and temper of the public with regard to the treatment of
crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization
of any country. "2
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code (originally, and
more colorfully, known as Section One of the Ku Klux Klan Act,3 and
also known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871) is the workhorse of modem
civil rights litigation.# No other part of the United States Code has
spawned as much litigation; no other statute has had a more profound
impact on citizens' relationship with government; no other law is more
central to present day police and correctional officer accountability. Yet
for its first 90 years, this remarkable piece of legislation remained virtu-
ally unknown and unused-a little known or understood relict of the
1. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIv. DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVI-
SORY COMMISSION OF CIVIL DISORDERS 160 (1968) [hereinafter The Kerner Commission].
The reports were created in response to Executive Order 11365, which established a Na-
tional Advisory Commission of Civil Disorders, also popularly known as "The Kerner
Commission." Id. at 19-23.
2. Winston Churchill, quoted in LYNN S. BRANHAM & SHELDON KRANTZ, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS (1996).
3. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. Three years later, it became § 1979 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States. Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1874).
4. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). The Act provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief
shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclu-
sively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
Id. (emphasis added).
5. There were the odd and unusual references to the statute, such as in Carter v.
Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 321-23 (1885), but these decisions were generally inconsequential
in comparison with the later decisions following Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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Compromise of 1877 ending reconstruction.6 It, however, was not written
in a vacuum. Its purpose, in part, was to effectuate broad constitutional
protections set in place in the aftermath of the Civil War. These protec-
tions did not remain static, so the history of the Act is intertwined with a
continuing history of expanding rights.
To generalize, perhaps over broadly, § 1983 provides a remedy to any
person whose federally protected rights have been abridged by any other
person acting under the color of state law or custom. 7 Thus, the rights
protected by this Act change with changing notions of what constitutes a
constitutional or federally protected right as well as changing notions of
what the appropriate remedy might be. Therefore, the history of this act
follows two strains.
First, there is the problem of figuring out just what the legislators in
1871 meant to do when they passed Section One of the Ku Klux Klan
Act. While historical insight remains elusive, contingent, and subject to
revision, still, one cannot properly apply, in the present, a law rooted in
history, unless one understands (at least in some sense) what was origi-
nally intended. This is not an argument for a rigid version of that puzzling
doctrine, "original intent." Rather, it is premised upon the understanding
that one must have some sense of the past in order to have any sense of
where to begin in the present.
Second, the rapid expansion of constitutionally protected rights as ap-
plied to the states in the twentieth century radically changed § 1983's
scope of action.8 Both strands must be understood to gain an apprecia-
tion for how this act works in modem America.
6. See, e.g., HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492 -
PRESENT 205-210 (Harper Collins 1999) (1980).
7. See generally Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
8. The first Supreme Court case incorporating a part of the Bill of Rights into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not come until 1925 in Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), which held that the First Amendment guarantees are a funda-
mental element of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. That the doctrine of
incorporation proved as controversial and difficult to implement may seem peculiar in light
of apparent Congressional intentions during Reconstruction. As historian Eric Foner
writes, "[T]he doctrine of 'incorporation'-that the states were now required not to violate
the Bill of Rights-had by 1874 become a virtually noncontroversial minimum Congres-
sional interpretation of the Amendment's purposes." Enic FONER, RECONSTRUCrION 533
(1988). Judges of the era, however, "could not bring themselves to declare that the Recon-
struction amendments had fundamentally altered the nature of the Union." Lou Falkner
Williams, The South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials and Enforcement of Federal Rights,
1871- 1872, 39 CIVIL WAR HISTORY 47,47 (1993). Thus, "confusion remained on the incor-
poration issue." Id.; see also Kermit L. Hall, Political Power and Constitutional Legitimacy:
The South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872, 33 EMORY L.J. 921, 945 (1984) (detail-
ing how the Circuit Court Judges rejected the prosecution's "theory of incorporation of the
fourth amendment into the fourteenth").
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II. ORIGINS OF THE Ku KLUX KLAN AcT
The year 1865 was, to say the least, a tumultuous year. General Robert
E. Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox end-
ing the Nation's bloodiest conflict,9 John Wilkes Booth assassinated Pres-
ident Lincoln, and Congress passed the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution freeing the former slaves. In 1866, Congress passed its first
civil rights act,' ° and in 1868 Congress passed the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which, among other things, made citizens of the newly freed slaves
and required the states to provide each new citizen due process and equal
protection of the laws." This, among other things, overruled the infa-
mous Dred Scott decision, which had held that free Black persons were
inherently inferior to whites, and thus could not be citizens. 12 The Fif-
teenth Amendment, enacted in 1870, gave Black males the right to vote.1 3
These constitutional protections were originally intended to benefit the
newly freed slaves but they were written in broad language that would
ultimately benefit everyone.
Radical Republicans (who, with reason, were suspicious of, and hostile
to, the state governments in the former Confederacy) controlled Con-
gress in the immediate post-Civil War era.' 4 Former Confederate Gen-
eral Nathaniel Bedford Forest led the Ku Klux Klan and then, when its
violence became too much even for him, attempted unsuccessfully to dis-
band it.'" The Ku Klux Klan, and other groups, such as the Knights of
9. According to C. Vann Woodward, "American lives lost in the Civil War exceed the
total of those lost in all the other wars the country has fought added together, world wars
included." C. Vann Woodward, Editor's Introduction, to JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE
CRY OF FREEDOM xvii-xix (C. Vann Woodward, ed. 1988).
10. Act of April 9, 1886, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. This Act was in part a precursor to the
equal protection clause; it made certain kinds of discrimination criminal and provided fed-
eral jurisdiction where local state courts were unavailable. Id. The Supreme Court nar-
rowed and arguably gutted this last part by holding it inapplicable to criminal prosecutions
of White persons whose victims were Black. See, e.g., Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 581 (1871) (holding that a federal court could not usurp jurisdiction simply because
the State of Kentucky would not permit two African-American witnesses to testify about
the murder of several African-Americans by two white males).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
12. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). The Dred Scott decision has been called
"one of the Court's great failures of nerve." Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 312 (1991) (testimony of Chief Judge Oakes).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
14. See John E. Lee, Note, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 153, 155-57 (1996) (describing
motives of Radical Republicans and subsequent acts of violence by the Ku Klux Klan).
15. Benjamin Quarles writes, "In 1869 the head of the Klan, Nathan B. Forrest,
alarmed at the recklessness of some of the local dens, ordered the organization dissolved,




the White Camelia and white-citizens councils, often acting under color
of state law, and often with the complicity of state and local government,
terrorized 6 and murdered,' 7 with impunity, the newly freed slaves and
any who supported them.' 8
The problem for Congress was how to make the new rights effective.
Congress intended the Civil Rights Act of 1871, a part of which has come
down to us as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to be a significant part of the solution. In
its current form, it provides federal court jurisdiction for any citizen
whose rights were abridged by any person acting under the color of state
law.' 9 This includes law enforcement officers, and anyone temporarily
deputized by them, or otherwise acting as an agent for state or local
governments.2 °
The original Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 was much broader than the
remnants that we see today in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986.21 It
included broad criminal penalties for various conspiracies by private per-
sons to abridge other citizens' rights. Among other things, it criminalized
conspiracies to hinder people in the exercise of the right to vote, and
16. Eric Foner writes, "In some areas, violence against blacks reached staggering pro-
portions ... 'they govern ... by the pistol and the rifle.' 'I saw white men whipping colored
men just the same as they did before the war."' FONER, supra note 8, at 119 (citations
omitted).
17. "In 1866, after 'some kind of dispute with some freedmen,' a group near Pine
Bluff, Arkansas, set fire to a black settlement and rounded up the inhabitants. A man who
visited the scene the following morning found 'a sight that apald [sic] me 24 Negro men
woman and children [sic] were hanging to trees all round the Cabbins."' Id. at 119.
18. "John Wesley North, a Northerner... in 1866 encountered a mob beating a freed-
man. When North intervened, the crowd dispersed, 'evidently amazed that any person
should venture to remonstrate against even the murder of a black man.' A local vender
subsequently offered the Yankee this advice: 'never in this country... interfere in behalf
of a nigger."' Id. at 121.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
20. See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 928-32 (1982) (describing stan-
dards for "under color of law").
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 are the civil conspiracy analogues to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
and provide a civil remedy for certain civil rights violations. Compare Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Actions under these
statutes are much less common. In many cases, the difficulty in proving class or race-based
animus is too high a threshold to meet. See, e.g., Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041 (6th Cir.
1999) (failing to allege that police use of excessive force was motivated by race or other
class based animus). In other cases, where the racism of at least one person may be plausi-
ble, the evidence fails to establish a conspiracy-an agreement or meeting of the minds to
violate a claimant's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370 (4th Cir.
1995) (failing to prove that law enforcement officials conspired to deprive the accused of




conspiracies to deny equal protection of the laws.22 Effective implemen-
tation depended on a broad interpretation of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments, in unreceptive nineteenth-century courts.
The first major test of Reconstruction civil rights legislation came in the
South Carolina Ku Klux Klan trials of 1871 to 1872.23 There, the lower
Circuit Court frustrated the prosecution's attempt to forge broad consti-
tutionally based rights and the Supreme Court ducked the important con-
stitutional issues. 24 Finally, in 1882 the Supreme Court effectively gutted
the criminal conspiracy portions of this Act by holding that the Four-
teenth Amendment applied solely to state action and did not encompass
acts by private individuals. 25 While the Supreme Court's restrictive inter-
pretation of the Reconstruction era's constitutional and legislative initia-
tives may seem harsh and insensitive to the modem sensibility, "[t]o its
contemporaries.., the Court appeared as a prime instrument of the con-
ciliation needed to signal the end of Reconstruction and a desired return
to 'normalcy.'" 26 More importantly, the civil remedies portion of this
statute now found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remained, albeit as we will see
shaped and constricted by this restrictive notion of state action under the
Due Process Clause.
The end of reconstruction, restrictive judicial interpretations, and the
"revolt of the red necks, 27 temporarily retired this statute.28 Little was
heard of this legislation during the era of Jim Crow. The Civil Rights
movement resurrected it; it remains the foremost of all of the civil rights
statutes spawning thousands of cases. It is the vehicle by which any citi-
zen can sue most, but not all,29 representatives of state and local govern-
22. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
23. Hall, supra note 8, at 947-48.
24. Id.
25. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 638-40 (1882).
26. BERNARD SWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 170 (1993).
27. A. KIRWIN, REVOLT OF THE REDNECKS; MIssissiPPI POLITICS 1876-1925 (1951).
28. A Lexis-Nexis search of 17 Stat.13 from 1871 to 1960 disclosed 16 United States
Supreme Court cases, and a similar search of 1979 Rev. Stat. revealed 7 cases. A search of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 from 1960 to present yields 585 Supreme Court citations alone, and lower
court opinions run in the thousands.
29. Only a relatively few, highly placed, officials are immune from suit and therefore
not subject to this statute. The Supreme Court in a variety of cases provided absolute
immunity to federal judges, Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871) (granting absolute immu-
nity in a civil liability suit brought against a judge for order of disbarment as a result of the
criminal trial of John H. Suratt, who was implicated in the assassination of Abraham Lin-
coln), state judges, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967), prosecutors, Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), federal hearing examiners and administrative law judges,
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978), attorneys prosecuting administrative proceed-
ings, id., the President, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 438 U.S. 731 (1981), witnesses (including police
officers) who testify in judicial proceedings, Butz, 438 U.S. at 512, grand jurors, Imbler, 424
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ments (including law enforcement and corrections officers) for
misconduct.
One must distinguish state law enforcement officers from federal law
enforcement officers. Although a suit against an FBI agent, for example,
is almost identical to a suit against a local law enforcement officer, the
roots of the two suits are conceptually different. Federal law enforce-
ment officers, unlike their state counterparts, are not covered by § 1983.30
However, the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
provided a remedy for the misconduct of federal officials,31 which is virtu-
ally identical in scope with a § 1983 action.32 Thus, except for the uni-
form worn, all law enforcement agents have similar liability, and similar
rules and defenses govern their conduct. For many purposes, we can
speak of § 1983 actions and Bivens actions as if they were the same thing.
While they have different origins, it is not ordinarily harmful to lump the
two conceptually.
A Bivens action is similar in scope with a § 198333 action while liability
under the Federal Tort Claims Act is "coterminous" with liability under
Bivens.3 4 Thus, many of the concepts that were originally developed in
§ 1983 litigation apply broadly to the entire field of official misconduct.
All law enforcement and corrections officers-state and federal-con-
front similar issues of liability. Thus, the history of the Ku Klux Klan Act
is relevant to understanding these other areas.
III. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE REVOLUTION IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY: FEDERALIZING POLICE AND CORRECTIONAL
OFFICERS' LIABILITY
Federal liability for local governmental wrongdoing revolutionized po-
licing and corrections. Before the 1960's, state and local officials were
effectively immune from liability for even the worst misconduct. Subject
U.S. at 423, and legislators, Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491
(1975). In each case, the absolute immunity attaches if, and only if, the individual is acting
in his or her official capacity. Because these officials are not subject to suit (other than for
injunctive relief and attorney's fees, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978)) under this civil
rights statute, they are not dealt with further.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
31. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389-392 (1971) (establishing
that a federal officer's unconstitutional conduct can result in a cause of action for
damages).
32. Id. at 389, 395-397 (comparing this newly judicially created claim to equivalent
§ 1983 claims).
33. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1979) (stating that punitive damages
may be had in a Bivens suit or in a § 1983 action); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-
201 (1985) (indicating that qualified immunity rules are the same in both types of actions).
34. Norton v. U.S., 581 F.2d 390, 393 (4th Cir. 1978).
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only to regulation by the individual states, flagrant brutality and other
misconduct by both police and corrections officials were often ignored.35
Lack of effective channels for redress were particularly troublesome for
minorities whose "feelings about hostile police conduct may even be ex-
ceeded by the conviction that ghetto neighborhoods are not given ade-
quate police protection."36 Historically, courts found that prisoners had
no rights,37 and therefore no access to the courts.38 Thus, despite abuses,
victims of police and correctional officers' misconduct rarely found a
remedy in this Nation's courts. The 1961 Supreme Court decision in
Monroe v. Pape39 changed the landscape; federal liability, enforceable in
a federal court, broadened accountability of state and local officials.4 °
This federal liability, for what had heretofore concerned only state law
is, in part,4 a consequence of the application of federal constitutional law
to state criminal procedure and to state jails and prisons. Such familiar
protections as the freedom of speech, the right against self-incrimination,
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and cruel and unusual
punishments did not originally apply to the states.42 States were free to
ignore the Bill of Rights. Even where those same rights were found in a
state's constitution, application was often lukewarm. State courts gener-
ally afforded fewer protections against governmental abuse than did their
federal counterparts. 43 This created the anomalous situation where state
35. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 92-93 (1945) (describing how police,
after arresting defendant, beat him into unconsciousness for some thirty minutes).
36. The Kerner Commission, supra note 1, at 161.
37. See, e.g., Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 790 (1871) (holding that the
Circuit court of Richmond did not err in refusing to remand the trial of the accused to the
county where the crime was committed, or in failing to select jurors from said county).
38. See Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 548-49 (1941) (demonstrating that prisons created
regulations to impede prisoners' access to the courts). A constitutional right of access to
the courts was established in 1941. Id. at 549-52.
39. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
40. Id. at 191-92.
41. No one would argue that the gradual incorporation of the many guarantees found
in the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment by itself was responsible for this
change. Many other factors beyond the scope of this article came together to make this
change possible. See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL
POLICY MAKING AND ThE MODERN STATE (1998) (discussing the various factors promi-
nent in the prison reform litigation cases).
42. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that rights granted by the
first eight amendments did not apply to the states because they were not privileges or
immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
43. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (holding that the exclusionary rule did
not apply to the states). At that time, 31 states rejected the exclusionary rule. Id. at 29.
Thus, the rule applied only to federal law enforcement agencies in those 31 states that
rejected the rule. See id.
[Vol. 7:151
CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
officials could oppress their citizens in ways prohibited to the federal
government.
The most influential citizens, at the Nation's founding, feared a domi-
nant federal government and believed that the states would "preserve the
rights of individuals."" Thus, much of the argument favoring inclusion of
a bill of rights in the U.S. Constitution revolved around the need to con-
strain a powerful federal government. It did not appear to be prudent to
burden the individual states, which were seen as guarantors of individual
liberties.
Lest this seem naive, one must recall that many of the landed gentry,
who created the U.S. Constitution, were powerful political forces in their
own states. The possibility that they could be tyrannized by state govern-
ments that they often controlled must have seemed remote. Oppression
of indigenous peoples, slaves, women, and other non-voters (which in-
cluded anyone who did not own property)45 was a lesser concern, al-
though the compromises generated by slavery caused many politicians in
the North and Upper-South considerable discomfiture.46 Moreover,
many of the states adopted bills of rights in their own constitutions before
the federal government. State governments surely seemed less threaten-
ing than a potentially all-powerful federal government.
Later events, particularly after the Civil War, proved that the states
could effectively oppress citizens just as a powerful federal government
lacking the constraints of the Bill of Rights might have.47 The proponents
of the Fourteenth Amendment well understood this history of abuses by
state governments. As the author of part of the Fourteenth Amendment
put it:
The States never had the right, though they had the power, to inflict
wrongs upon free citizens by a denial of the full protection of the
laws.... [And] the States did deny to citizens the equal protection
of the laws, they did deny the rights of citizens under the Constitu-
tion, and except to the extent of the express limitations upon the
States, as I have shown, the citizen had no remedy.... They took
44. ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAN, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGrTS 1776-1791 111
(Northeastern Univ. Press 1983) (1955).
45. Melvyn R. Durchslag, Salyer, Ball, and Holt: Reappraising the Right to Vote in
Terms of Political "Interest" and Vote Dilution, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 2-3 n.8 (1982)
(citing K. PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 48-76 (2d ed. 1969)).
46. For example, Antifederalist Joshua Atherton argued against the adoption of the
Constitution because of the slave trade, telling the Convention "that by voting for the
Constitution 'we become consenters to, and partakers in, the sin and guilt of this abomina-
ble traffic, at least for a certain period, without any positive stipulation' that it should even
then [1808] be brought to an end."' RUTLAND, supra note 44, at 165.
47. See generally FONER, supra note 8.
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property without compensation, and he had no remedy. They re-
stricted the freedom of the press, and he had no remedy. They re-
stricted the freedom of speech, and he had no remedy. They
restricted the rights of conscience, and he had no remedy .... Who
dare say, now that the Constitution has been amended, that the na-
tion cannot by law provide against all such abuses and denials of
right as these in the States and by States, or combinations of
persons?48
The history of state-sanctioned abuses of citizens, before and after the
Fourteenth Amendment, and particularly in minority communities, is too
voluminous to summarize here. Hostility to law enforcement in minority
communities has been well documented. As the Kerner Commission Re-
port put it, "[A]brasive relationships between police and . . .minority
groups have been a major source of grievance, tension, and ultimately
disorder."9 Severe abuses in some of America's prisons have likewise
been well documented.5 ° As the Supreme Court put it in 1977 speaking
of Alabama's prison system:
The environment in Alabama's penitentiaries is a peculiarly inhospi-
table one for human beings of whatever sex. Indeed, a Federal Dis-
trict Court has held that the conditions of confinement in the prisons
of the State, characterized by "rampant violence" and a "jungle at-
mosphere," are constitutionally intolerable.5'
Even a cursory review of those abuses discloses the reason for federal
constitutional protections as a counter, however incomplete, to state
oppression.
The debate over whether the massive changes in criminal procedure of
the 1960's was driven by "concerns about racism"52 or by "longstanding
fears about the abuse of state power, 53 is unnecessary to the present con-
cern. It suffices that the courts had compelling reasons to bring state
criminal procedures, and state jails and prisons, under federal constitu-
tional constraints. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment supplied the fulcrum for this enormous change and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
supplied the most effective, and often resorted to, remedy.
48. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 685 n.45 (1978) (citing
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong. 1st Sess., 85 (1871)).
49. The Kerner Commission, supra note 1, at 157.
50. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681-85 (1978).
51. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (citation omitted).
52. Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Editor's Preface to TRACEY L. MEARES & DAN M.
KAHAN, URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES XV, XVi




The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, was designed, in part, to
protect the newly freed slaves.54 Section One, among other things, made
citizens of the newly freed slaves, and required the states to afford all
citizens due process and equal protection of the law." It quickly came to
prevent invidious discrimination against other racial groups.56 There is
controversy over how broadly the Fourteenth Amendment swept in that
era.57 Whatever the historical basis for the Due Process Clause, its sweep
broadened as various elements of the Bill of Rights became incorporated
into the concept of due process.
Beginning with Gitlow v. New York58 in 1925 the Supreme Court began
to apply the various guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the states by incor-
porating them into the protections of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Thus, broad due process language came to include
other rights found within the first ten amendments. After some debate
about the theoretical basis for incorporation, the Court decided upon se-
lective incorporation of those parts of the Bill of Rights that were consid-
ered to be fundamental to an ordered liberty.59 Thus, not all of the first
ten amendments to the Constitution were applied to the states as a result
of incorporation into the Due Process Clause. As the Court in Duncan v.
Louisiana put it in 1968:
The test for determining whether a right extended by the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments with respect to federal criminal proceedings is
also protected against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment
has been phrased in a variety of ways in the opinions of this Court.
The question has been asked whether a right is among those "funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions"; whether it is "basic in our system of
jurisprudence"; and whether it is "a fundamental right, essential to a
fair trial."'
54. Carol Rhodes, Symposium, Changing the Constitutional Guarantee Voting Rights
from Color-Conscious to Color Blind: Judicial Activism by the Rehnquist Court, 16 Miss.
C.L. REv. 309, 317-18 (1996).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
56. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that the enforcement of city
regulations, which resulted in the imprisonment of only Asian-American citizens, violated
the Fourteenth Amendment).
57. See, e.g., Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14 N.Y.L. ScH. J.
HUM. Rrs. 375, 402-34 (1998) (debating the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
era).
58. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
59. STONE ET. AL, CONsTrrTTiONAL LAW 706-09 (4th ed. 2001).
60. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (citations omitted). In Duncan,
the Court held that the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment was
applicable to the states by virtue of incorporation into the Due Process Clause. Id.
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Throughout the 1960's the Supreme Court applied more and more of
the protections of the Bill of Rights to state criminal prosecutions. As the
Court summarized the status of the issue:
The Fourteenth Amendment denies the States the power to "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
In resolving conflicting claims concerning the meaning of this spa-
cious language, the Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of
Rights for guidance; many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight
Amendments to the Constitution have been held to be protected
against state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. That clause now protects the right to compensation for
property taken by the State; the rights of speech, press, and religion
covered by the First Amendment; the Fourth Amendment rights to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and to have ex-
cluded from criminal trials any evidence illegally seized; the right
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to be free of compelled self-
incrimination; and the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, to a
speedy and public trial, to confrontation of opposing witnesses, and
to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses.61
The constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishments under the
Eighth Amendment was applied to the states in Robinson v. California,62
which placed jails and prisons under increased constitutional scrutiny. No
longer were prison cases limited to conscience shocking conduct that was
"offensive to a decent respect for the dignity of man, and heedless of his
freedom., 63 Pre-trial detainees, who have not been convicted, and thus
cannot be punished, do not come under the Eighth Amendment ban on
cruel and unusual punishments. 64 However, federal pre-trial detainees
now have constitutional protection under the Due Process language of
the Fifth Amendment. 65 Similarly, state and local detainees have protec-
tion under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
61. Id. at 147-48.
62. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
63. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 468 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Although, in Francis, eight members of the Supreme Court were prepared to
assume without deciding that the Eighth Amendment applied to the states, see id. at 375-
78, the issue was not decided until Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660. Under preincorporation due
process analysis, a state's action had to literally shock the judicial conscience before a fed-
eral court would intervene. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-173 (1952).
64. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16 (1979) (citing Ingrahm v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 671-72 (1977)).
65. Id. at 535-37.
66. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (addressing presumption of innocence
implied by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Thus, constitutional restrictions increasingly restrained and regulated dis-
cretionary police and correctional officers' conduct.
This growing constitutional regulation of state and local officials, in-
cluding law enforcement and correctional officers, led directly to liability
issues. Violation of a person's basic constitutional rights by another per-
son, acting on behalf of a state or local government, triggered the protec-
tion of an old post-Civil War statute-the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now
42 U.S.C. § 1983. For a time, the Civil Rights Act was restrictively read
to include only the actions of state officials that were expressly authorized
by state law.67 This conservative reading of § 1983 began to change at
about the same time that the Due Process Clause was selectively incorpo-
rating many of the guarantees of the federal Bill of Rights.6"
Similar liability rules also came to apply to federal officials.6 9 The ap-
plication of major parts of the Bill of Rights to the states provided the
basis for § 1983 actions to work. For example, the very first case impos-
ing federal liability upon state or local law enforcement, Monroe v.
Pape,7° would not have been possible without the Supreme Court's 1949
decision in Wolf v. Colorado.7  Wolf held that the Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures applied to the
states by virtue of incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment.72
Monroe dealt with local law enforcement officers who violated a citizen's
constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.73 Before the Fourth
Amendment applied to the states, a lawsuit against state or local officers
could not have been based upon such a constitutional violation. There
had to be a federal right before one had any federal basis for suit; there
had to be a violation of federal law before § 1983 could apply.74 Once the
federal right applied to state officials, lawsuits seeking a remedy for the
violation of that right became conceivable. It is only a small step from
lawyers being able to conceive of a successful lawsuit to someone at-
tempting that suit. Thus, the imposition of liability upon state officials
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is inextricably interwoven with the civil rights
revolution applying the Bill of Rights to state criminal prosecutions. The
two cannot be separated. Once this had been achieved, it was only a
67. Eric H. Zagrans, 'Under Color of What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section
1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REv. 499, 524-25 (1985).
68. See FaELEY & RUBIN, supra note 41, at 32-34.
69. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
70. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
71. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
72. Id. at 27-28.
73. 365 U.S. at 167.
74. David Sloss, Ex Parte Young and Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty Vio-
lations, 75 WASH. L. REv. 1103, 1142-44 (2000).
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short step to apply the same rules to federal law enforcement and correc-
tions officials.
IV. THE EARLY DECISIONS: THE BEGINNINGS OF FEDERAL LIABILITY
FOR OFFICIAL MISCONDuCT IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
Monroe v. Pape71 changed everything. Before it, state and local law
enforcement officials were not subject to federal liability; after it, such
suits became possible.
One can hardly imagine better facts for a plaintiff aiming to create new
law. Thirteen Chicago police officers broke into the Monroe's home
without a warrant, rousted the family from bed, and made both husband
and wife stand naked while they searched the place, ransacked every
room, emptied drawers, and ripped mattress covers.76 Mr. Monroe was
detained 10 hours on "open" charges and questioned about a two-day old
murder; he was not taken before a magistrate, even though one was avail-
able, and not allowed to call his family or a lawyer.77 He sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers acted under color of state and city
law.
78
The Monroe complaint alleged a violation of the "guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the Fourth Amendment
[which] has been made applicable to the States by reason of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment., 79 Neither the officers
nor the city contended that it would have been reasonable, within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to break into a house, conduct a
warrantless search, and force the occupants to stand naked in the middle
75. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). There were several precursors to Monroe, which relaxed the
"color of law" standard to include actions by governmental officials that were made possi-
ble because the actor was clothed with the power of state law. See, e.g., United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) ("Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and
made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is
action taken 'under color of' state law."); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (find-
ing Georgia police officers, although violating state and federal law, acted "under color of
law" because the violation arose out of the authority granted to them by state law). How-
ever, it was not until Monroe that the floodgates to federal litigation in official misconduct
cases opened. Jeffrey Brian Greenstein, The First Amendment v. the First Amendment:
The Dilemma of Inherently Competing Rights in Free-Speech Based "Constitutional Torts,"
71 UMKC L. REv. 27,61 n.267 (2002). The incorporation of many of the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause, a process that accelerated in the 1950's and
60's, played a large part in making Monroe possible.
76. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 171.
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of everything while the house was torn apart.8' Neither did they contend
that the warrantless seizure and subsequent incommunicado detention
was reasonable.81 If any police search and seizure could be said to have
been unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, this surely was it. The
question, however, was not whether the police violated Monroe's consti-
tutional rights, but rather, whether this violation gave rise to a federal
cause of action under § 1983.82
This case is very different from the usual way in which an illegal search
and seizure issue is framed. Much of the complaint against the Supreme
Court's application of the exclusionary rule to the states, 83 concerned the
resultant freeing of demonstrably guilty, and occasionally dangerous,
criminals.' 4 When evidence is suppressed because the police have be-
haved illegally the prosecution often loses its clearest evidence of guilt.
No one likes to free a murderer, or other dangerous felons, because the
"constable has blundered."85 In Monroe, however, we are not concerned
with the suppression of evidence in a criminal trial. Rather, the issue is
whether an innocent person should have a federal remedy for damages
caused by an illegal search.
It is easy to criticize supposed technicalities that free the obviously
guilty. One's perspective changes when the issue becomes how to protect
the innocent from abusive governmental intrusion. Given the failure of
the various state courts to adequately address this type of claim prior to
1961, one also ought to ask whether even the guilty should suffer
Monroe's humiliation without effective redress. One person's technical-
ity becomes another's issue of freedom. However one views the issue
politically, the issue comes down to how society protects itself from gov-
ernmental abuse while maintaining order.
The officers in Monroe contended that § 1983 could not apply where
state law already prohibited the conduct and provided a remedy for the
violation.86 They argued that since their activities violated state law, for
which the state supplied a civil remedy, they could not have acted "under
color of state law." 87 Put another way, actions "under the color of law"
seem inconsistent with actions that violate law. One cannot, they
thought, act under a law and violate it at the same time.88 Thus, the
80. See id. at 170.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 172.
83. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to the states).
84. See id. at 658.
85. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).





Court confronted the question: does the "under color of" state law re-
quirement include acts of officials who violate state law where state law
provides a remedy? 9
It might seem fair, if state law supplies a remedy, to send the plaintiff
back to state court. Why tie up a busy federal district court with a matter
that could be resolved in state court? However, one has only to review
the various states' lack of interest in allowing citizens to sue abusive state
officials, to see that this was a remedy available in theory only. States,
whatever their individual laws might say, were not overly hospitable to
claims that their officials had violated citizens' rights.9 Moreover, it was
clear that this state inaction, in the face of governmental abuse, was one
of the original reasons for § 1983's enactment.
While the officers' narrow construction of § 1983 had enjoyed support
in earlier years, the notion that it did not touch official actions that were a
misuse of state power had been eroded in two cases from the 1940's.91
The Supreme Court rejected the officer's contention and held that the
"under color of" state law language in § 1983 includes official actions,
regardless of whether those actions violated state law. 2 The Court rea-
soned that the statute was enacted to provide redress for violations of
federal law.9 3 That an unreasonable search violates the Fourth Amend-
ment and the Fourth Amendment had, by this time, been made applica-
ble to the states through incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.94
According to the Court, the purposes of § 1983 were:
1. to supersede certain state laws that were contrary to the rights or
privileges of U.S. citizens;
2. to provide a federal remedy in areas where state protection was
deficient; and




91. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945). In holding state officials (commissioners of elections) criminally liable, the Classic
court was instrumental in redefining "color of law," declaring misuse of state authority is
"action taken 'under color of' state law." Classic, 313 U.S. at 326. This view was affirmed
in Screws, where the Court held that the abuse of a prisoner attempting to escape, by
police officers, was done "under the color of law." Screws, 325 U.S. at 107-08.
92. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172, 183.
93. Id. at 171.
94. Id. (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 213 (1960)).
95. Id. at 173-74.
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Because Congress, in enacting the predecessor to § 1983, had intended
to provide a remedy for official misconduct even when in violation of
state law, it clearly covered the situation at bar where the police had en-
gaged in a patently illegal search and seizure.96 Accordingly, Monroe
held that a state law enforcement officer could be held civilly liable in
federal court for violating the constitutional rights of a U.S. citizen, even
when those activities violated state laws that could have been redressed in
state courts.97 Thus, the criminal procedure revolution of the 1960's di-
rectly led to federal liability for state law enforcement officers.
Additionally, Monroe was against the City of Chicago. 98 That part of
the Monroe decision, which held that the city was immune from such law-
suits, was later overruled by Monell v. Department of Social Services of
City of New York, 99 thereby allowing municipalities and other arms of
local government to be sued, albeit, under restrictive circumstances.
V. CORRECrIONAL OFFICERS
Monroe only involved law enforcement officers. 100 Its central holding,
however, applied to all state officials, including corrections officers, who
violate a person's federally protected rights. 10' Monroe could plausibly
be read as a prisoner's rights case. The plaintiffs had alleged that the
officers had made Monroe a prisoner-first, by holding him incommuni-
cado to investigate the case, and also by imprisoning him without trial.1°2
However, because Monroe turned on the Fourth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against unreasonable seizures rather than the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, it is more easily read as a
law enforcement case rather than as a corrections case. Nonetheless, it is
impossible to overstate the broad nature of the holding; Monroe came to
cover all matters of misconduct by all types of state officials.
One year after Monroe, the Supreme Court incorporated the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment into the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause in Robinson v. California.°3 Robin-
son, despite its broader implications, was not a prisoner's rights case. It
was not concerned with prison conditions or illegal confinements; rather,
96. Id. at 172-76.
97. Id. at 183.
98. Id. at 174.
99. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
100. Monroe, 635 U.S. at 169.
101. Id. at 186-87. The court declared the "color of law" interpretation under. Classic
and Screws to be correct in light of Congress' decision not to affirmatively restrict the
language in the subsequent amendments that followed the two cases. Id. at 187.
102. Id. at 204 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
103. 370 U.S. at 667.
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it involved a simple appeal from a criminal conviction.1 "4 The Court's
narrow holding invalidated a state statute making simple addiction to
narcotics, without more, a crime.' 5 Punishment for drug addiction, the
Court held, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and cannot, there-
fore, constitute the sole basis for a conviction."° The broader principle,
however, that the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment applied to the states, opened the door for state officials, including
correctional officers, to be held responsible under § 1983. Such cases
were not long in coming.
For example, in 1964 the Court held that a prisoner's allegation that he
was denied permission to purchase religious materials solely because of
his religious beliefs stated a cause of action.10 7 Thereafter, the Supreme
Court applied § 1983 to prisoners' cases. 108 In 1972, the Court in Cruz v.
Beto allowed a § 1983 action by a Buddhist prisoner who had been denied
religious rights while in prison.'0 9 The Court held that a prisoner must be
given "a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the
opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional relig-
ious precepts.... "'10 Moreover, prisoner cases alleging violations of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 were increasingly filed in the lower federal courts." In the
decade following Monroe, more than ninety prison cases involving § 1983
were reported in the various federal courts of appeals." 2 It did not take
long for federal liability under § 1983 to become meaningful to both the
law enforcement and corrections communities.
VI. LIABILITY OF FEDERAL OFFICIALS
It would have seemed perverse to the ordinary citizen had the Court
shielded federal officers from liability for wrongdoing now applied to
their state counterparts. The citizen, who has been unlawfully beaten,
searched, shot, or arrested, hardly cares whom the officer's employer
might be. Nonetheless, courts typically attempt to ground their decisions
104. Id. at 660-61.
105. Id. at 666-67.
106. Id. (declaring the act unconstitutional since it imprisoned individuals who have
never had contact with any drug or have been guilty of any troublesome behavior).
107. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
108. See generally Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); Wilwording v. Swenson,
404 U.S. 249 (1971).
109. 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
110. Id. at 322.
111. For an excellent and exhaustive account of the judicial reform of prisons in the
United States see generally FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 41.
112. A Lexis-Nexis search of prison cases from 1961 to 1971 and involving at least
some aspects of a § 1983 action revealed 92 cases in the several courts of appeals.
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in positive law. Where was the law that supplied a remedy as against
federal law enforcement and corrections officers? As we have seen, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 only applies to persons acting under color of law of "any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia.""' 3 The U.S. government
is not encompassed by this language, and § 1983 does not apply to per-
sons acting under color of federal law. Judges are not supposed to make
law up as they go along, yet, occasionally they must create. It could
hardly be otherwise. Anomalies are the inevitable consequence of Su-
preme Court decision-making that is by design piecemeal and limited to
the facts of the specific cases before it. The Court's opportunity to ad-
dress the gap created by Monroe came in 1971.
The Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents ad-
dressed the question "whether [a] violation of [the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures] by a federal
agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for
damages consequent upon his unconstitutional conduct." 1 4 Bivens al-
leged that Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents, without a warrant, without
probable cause, and with an unreasonable use of force, arrested him in
his home, searched his home, handcuffed him in front of his wife and
kids, threatened to arrest his entire family, took him to a federal court-
house, interrogated him, booked him, and strip searched him.115 While
this seems no worse than the police behavior in Monroe, these allega-
tions, if true, constituted clear abuse of authority. Like the plaintiff in
Monroe, Bivens provided the Court with a sympathetic injured citizen.
The federal agents, somewhat like the defendants in Monroe, argued
that Bivens should be limited to his remedies in state court. 1 6 Under this
theory, the Fourth Amendment would serve to limit the extent to which
the officers could defend the case under state law. 1 17 In addition, a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment would deprive them of the defense that
their actions were a valid exercise of federal power." 8 This, so their ar-
gument went, would open the federal agents to liability under state tort
law, just like any other private citizen."'
The Department of Justice, however, conceded that had Bivens sued in
state court, the Department would have removed the case to federal
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
114. 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 390-91 (arguing that Bivens' claim was an unconstitutional invasion of pri-
vacy, a state tort that could only be redressed in the state courts).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 391.
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court. 2 0 The Federal District Court would then have faced the problem
of deciding the case under state law. 2' This would deprive the citizen of
a federal remedy, while it would still put the case before a federal judge
who would have to apply unfamiliar state law.
Moreover, this position might well have granted amnesty to the federal
agents even though their actions violated the Constitution. 122 Exonera-
tion would have resulted in placing federal agents in the position of pri-
vate citizens acting under state law."23 State law does not necessarily
mirror the Fourth Amendment. For example, an arrest made without
probable cause would violate the Fourth Amendment but still could be
permissible under state law. 124 Placing federal officers, who have vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment, in the position of private citizens under
state law, would erect state law hurdles that state officers, sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, would not face.
Further, the interests protected by state tort law and the Fourth
Amendment are different. 25 We may keep trespassers and intruders out
and we can seek police protection against them; we are not, however,
entitled to obstruct federal law enforcement entry, whether or not they
act illegally. 126 No state police officer will come to our aid in refusing
entry to federal law enforcement. Indeed in many states, it is a crime to
resist law enforcement officers regardless of whether they are acting
under lawful authority. 127 Since state law can neither authorize, nor limit,
federal agents in conducting a search, the federal question "becomes not
merely a possible defense to the state law action, but an independent
claim both necessary and sufficient to make out the plaintiff's cause of
action.' 12' Finally, "[h]istoricaly, damages have been regarded as the or-
dinary remedy for an invasion of personal interest in liberty.' 129 Thus,
120. Id
121. Id
122. See id. at 392 (declaring abuse under color of law by federal agents is more harm-
ful than abuse from an individual with no authority).
123. Id. at 391-92.
124. Id. at 392 (illustrating the example of a valid citizen's arrest effectuated without
probable cause).
125. Id. at 394 (referring to the differences between state tort laws of trespass and
invasion of privacy and the constitutional protections against illegal searches and seizures).
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Penn Lerblance, Resisting Unlawful Arrest A Due Process Perspective,
35 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 261, 269-70 (1987). As Lerblance explains, Illinois's legislature
passed a law that made the resistance of an arrest a crime, regardless of whether the arrest
was lawful. Id. In addition, Lerblance reports that some courts have done away with the
judicial-made rule of the right to resist arrest. Id.




the judicial creation of a damage remedy seemed no large innovation.
The majority concluded that, assuming the validity of Bivens' allegations,
there is a federal remedy for constitutional violations by federal law en-
forcement officers. 130
Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing that only the legislature could
appropriately fill this gap in the law. 13 1 However anomalous, Burger
would not have created a remedy for wrongdoing by federal law enforce-
ment officers. Justice Burger, in a provocative proposal, sought to throw
out the exclusionary rule if, and only if, Congress created a civil damage
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. 132 Justice Burger was perhaps
ahead of the debate. Now even some liberals, who might once have ener-
getically defended the exclusionary rule, are prepared to consider
whether substituting a civil remedy could better deter police
misconduct. 1
33
Bivens was limited to violations of the Fourth Amendment.13 4 Unlike
§ 1983, it did not touch other kinds of constitutional violations; nor did it
encompass other violations of federal statutory law. The Supreme Court
has since extended Bivens to violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amend-
ments, thus encompassing most instances of constitutional misconduct.135
This makes Bivens the functional equivalent to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, at least
insofar as constitutional violations by federal law enforcement and cor-
rectional officers are concerned. 136
Bivens has been subject to some judicial narrowing in recent years. It
is not applicable to Social Security denials where extensive federal reme-
130. Id. at 397.
131. Id. at 411-12, 418 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 415.
133. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary
Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 363.
134. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
135. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (Fifth Amendment cause of action); Carl-
son v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (Eighth Amendment cause of action).
136. Bivens-type actions are similar in scope with § 1983 actions. See, e.g., Carlson,
446 U.S. at 22 (pointing out that punitive damages can be had in both Bivens and § 1983
actions). The qualified immunity doctrine applies with equal force to both types of actions
as well. See, e.g., Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985) (applying doctrine of qualified
immunity of federal prison officials in a Bivens-type action); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335
(1986) (applying the qualified immunity doctrine to a § 1983 action). Finally, liability
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for the intentional torts of law enforcement
officers "is coterminous with... Bivens." Norton v. U.S., 581 F.2d 390, 393 (4th Cir. 1978)
(holding that good faith is a defense for an intentional tort under 28 U.S.C. 2680(h) just as
it would have been under a Bivens action). Thus, for most practical purposes, one need not
distinguish between § 1983, Bivens, and the FTCA; the rules creating civil liability are iden-
tical in most cases.
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dies have already been supplied by Congress.137 Likewise, it is not appli-
cable to enlisted military personnel who operate under a separate
congressionally created system of justice.138 Finally, Bivens is not appli-
cable to alleged violations of governmental employees' freedom of
speech, again because of the extensive administrative remedies provided
by Congress. 1 39 These decisions do not affect the liability of federal of-
ficers for constitutional violations of citizen's rights. They do, however,
serve to remind us that, while § 1983 and Bivens actions are based on the
Constitution, they are not themselves commanded by the Constitution.
Congress could, at any time, change the rules.
VII. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS Acr
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)' 4 should be mentioned briefly.
The FTCA is applicable to the intentional torts of federal agents "who
[are] empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to
make arrests for violations of Federal law."'' Thus, the Act covers most
law enforcement officers; however, liability is placed against the federal
government rather than the individual officers.' 42 One may bring an
FTCA claim concurrently with a Bivens action, 143 but an election must be
made. 1" In addition, a FTCA judgment against the government will bar
a subsequent Bivens claim. 145
The advantage of proceeding under the FTCA is that one looks to the
deep pockets of the federal government for recovery rather than against
the often judgment-proof individual officers. 146  Unlike Bivens and
137. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
138. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
139. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
140. Pub. L. 108-356, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as revised in scared sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
141. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000). In 1974, this amendment made the intentional torts
of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious prose-
cution actionable against the government. Id.
143. See generally Stefan Sciaraffa, Note, Section 2676 of the FTCA: Why It Should
Not Bar Contemporaneously Filed Bivens Claims, 24 Am. J. CRIM. L. 147 (1996) (discussing
simultaneously filed actions and criticizing the barring effect the FTCA has on the
judgment).
144. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (2000); see also Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1513 n.10
(9th Cir. 1991) (requiring election); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 570
F.2d 1197, 1201 (4th Cir. 1978) (refusing to impose joint and several liability); Moon v.
Price, 213 F.2d 794, 796-97 (5th Cir. 1954) (same); United States v. First Sec. Bank of Utah,
208 F.2d 424, 428 (10th Cir. 1953) (same).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 2676.
146. See Sciaraffa, supra note 143, at 150 n.11 (reporting the policy reasons announced
by the 93rd Congress).
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§ 1983,147 however, punitive damages and trial by jury are not available
under the FTCA, 48 attorney's fees are limited to 25% of the recovery, 149
and there is a two-year statute of limitations.' 50 Often plaintiffs will ini-
tially proceed simultaneously against the federal officers under Bivens,
any state officers that may be involved under § 1983, and against the
deep-pocketed federal government under the FTCA. If the case is strong
and punitive damages are perceived to be recoverable, the FTCA claim
may be dropped in favor of the more lucrative Bivens action. As a practi-
cal matter, the FICA is of less importance to most law enforcement and
correctional officers than Bivens and § 1983.
VIII. THE ELIMINATION OF AN EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES
REQUIREMENT FROM MOST CASES UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The Monroe Court had indicated that exhaustion would not be re-
quired in § 1983 litigation: "It is no answer that the State has a law which
if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the
state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before
the federal one is invoked."15'
A series of early cases extended Monroe by eliminating any exhaus-
tion-of-remedies requirement in a variety of differing factual situations
arising under § 1983.152 This freed plaintiffs from having to exhaust state
court or state administrative remedies before instituting an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
For example, state courts and state administrative agencies frequently
posed an impenetrable impediment for the civil rights movement. State
law often provided a remedy for official misconduct that looked good on
paper but in practice provided no relief. Civil rights activists were partic-
ularly vulnerable to state manipulation of the court system. Among other
things, elimination of the exhaustion requirement made civil rights litiga-
147. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21-22 (1980); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000); see also Carlson, 446 U.S. at 22.
149. 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (2000); see also Campbell v. United States, 835 F.2d 193, 196
(9th Cir. 1987); Joe v. United States, 772 F.2d 1535, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1985).
150. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000).
151. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
152. See, e.g., McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963) (concerning segregation
of a public school); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967) (regarding welfare benefits);
Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (relating to the seizure of a prisoner's legal mate-




tion much easier. McNeese v. Board of Education153 provides a good
example.
In McNeese, the plaintiffs claimed that the local school system re-
mained segregated in violation of federal law.'54 The District Court dis-
missed the complaint, among other things, on the ground that the
plaintiffs had not exhausted the remedies provided by state law. 155 The
court of appeals agreed but the Supreme Court reversed and allowed the
suit to proceed in federal court without reference to possible state court
remedies. 156
Most police misconduct cases, therefore, will not be affected by any-
thing that the state courts or state administrative agencies do. However,
Congress, in enacting 42 U.S.C. 1997e, returned the exhaustion-of-reme-
dies requirement in prisoner suits under § 1983.157 That Act provides in
part:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C.
1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative reme-
dies as are available are exhausted.' 58
Because of this, prisoners must exhaust state administrative remedies
before filing § 1983 actions in federal court. Cases against state officials,
including police officers and their municipal employers, have no such
requirement. 159
IX. INJUNCTIONS AGAINST STATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
INVOLVING CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED CONDUCT
Criminal prosecutions are different. One ordinarily could not enjoin a
state criminal prosecution by filing a § 1983 action. Federal courts fre-
quently followed this practice even though the state action may trench
upon constitutionally protected rights."6  Prior to Dombrowski v.
Phister,16 ' decided only four years after Monroe, federal courts did not
interfere in state court criminal proceedings, but could "depart from [this
153. 373 U.S. at 668.
154. 373 U.S. at 669-70.
155. Id. at 670.
156. Id. at 674-75.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000).
158. Id.
159. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
160. CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 343
(6th ed. 2002) (citing, as the leading case, Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943)).
161. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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limitation] if necessary to prevent irreparable injury."' 62 Dombrowski
changed this, if only a little bit.
Dombrowski permitted the federal courts in a § 1983 action to enjoin
threatened state prosecution of civil rights activists under a state's facially
overbroad, "subversive activities" statute. This seemingly had the poten-
tial to dramatically change the prevailing practice, at least where no pros-
ecution had formally commenced. Had it not been significantly
constrained by later case law,' 63 Dombrowski would also have greatly ex-
panded federal judicial power at the expense of the states.
Dombrowski is best explained as a product of the civil rights era. The
Supreme Court of that era often found it necessary to stop southern
states from prosecuting legitimate political activity under the guise of
other laws, such as vagrancy.' 64 Many of these civil rights cases involved
outrageous facts, which drove changes in U.S. constitutional law.
Dombrowski was the executive director of an organization that actively
fostered civil rights for African-Americans in the South.165 The organiza-
tion, its attorney, and Dombrowski were continually threatened with ar-
rests, seizures, and threats of prosecution under Louisiana's
constitutionally overbroad statute involving so-called "subversive activi-
ties.' 16 6 Louisiana authorities were invoking the law, not to obtain con-
victions, but rather to harass activists and to "discourage them and their
supporters from asserting and attempting to vindicate the constitutional
rights of Negro citizens of Louisiana. , 167 The Court avoided the possible
application of the Anti-Injunction Act 168 by pointing out that the state
grand jury had not convened until after the filing of the federal com-
plaint.' 69 There was, quite literally, no state prosecution in existence at
the time of the filing and thus no state proceedings within the meaning of
the Anti-Injunction Act.' 70
Noting the chilling effects that this kind of harassment had on free
speech, the Court found that, if the allegations were true, injunctive relief
should have been granted by the lower federal courts.171 The pertinent
question at the time was how broadly the case was to be read. Could it be
used whenever free speech rights could be chilled by overzealous state
162. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 160, at 343.
163. See infra part X.
164. See, e.g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
165. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 482.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
169. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 485.
170. Id. at 484.
171. Id. at 487-91.
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prosecution, or was the case limited to situations where the prosecution
was acting in bad faith or where there were other extraordinary circum-
stances justifying federal intervention in state prosecutions?
Many litigants read Dombrowski broadly to permit federal court inter-
vention to stop any state prosecution that had a chilling effect on free
speech.172 This interpretation, had it proved correct, would have pro-
vided a substantial avenue for interfering in state criminal prosecutions.
However, six years later, the Supreme Court decided Younger v. Har-
ris.1 7 3 The Court narrowly confined Dombrowski to free speech cases in
circumstances involving bad faith or harassment, where state law was so
clearly illegal as to be void in all possible circumstances, or where other
unusual circumstances existed. 174 Absent these factors, a federal court
ordinarily should abstain from interfering in state prosecutions regardless
of the potential chilling effect on speech.175
Mitchum v. Foster1 76 drove home the narrowness of this opening.
Mitchum sought a federal injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when a state
court closed his bookstore, arguing that the bookstore's closing violated
his freedom of speech and due process.' 7 7 In a case of first impression,
the Court held that a § 1983 claim satisfied the "expressly authorized"
exception of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 and empowered federal courts to enjoin a
state criminal proceeding17 8-a holding neither Dombrowski nor
Younger touched on.' 7 9 The ruling was expressly narrowed to the facts of
the case, underscored by the announcement that the Court would "not
question or qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and feder-
alism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court
proceeding."'80
Notwithstanding Dombrowski's narrow reach, lower courts continued
to find circumstances where prosecutorial bad faith warranted injunctive
relief, especially in cases that involved free speech values.18'
172. See WRIGHT, supra note 160, at 343-44.
173. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
174. Id. at 53-54.
175. Id. at 54.
176. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
177. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 227.
178. Id. at 226.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 243.
181. Farmer v. Sherrod, No. 2:93-CV-0017-J, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5526, at *31-32
(N.D. Tex. 1993) (preliminary injunction granted after finding substantial evidence indicat-
ing prosecutions were retaliatory); Westin v. McDaniel, 760 F. Supp. 1563, 1568 (M.D. Ga.
1991), affd, 949 F.2d 1163 (11th Cir. 1991) (comity and federalism did not prevent federal
injunction against prosecutor seeking a grand jury indictment after the felonious charge
was dismissed following a commitment hearing); PHE, Inc. v. Dep't of Justice, 743 F. Supp.
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Moreover, injunctions against law enforcement agencies prevented ille-
gal arrests and other forms of intimidation where no prosecution ex-
isted.' 82 Thus, in Alle v. Medrano, an injunction against law enforcement
officers to prevent a pervasive pattern of illegal arrests and intimidation
of farm union organizers under unconstitutional Texas statutes was
proper since there were no pending state prosecutions and injury would
have been irreparable without the remedy. 183 Younger does not apply
where there is no current state prosecution. 184 Allee's holding, therefore,
permits injunctions against law enforcement action where "there is a per-
sistent pattern of police misconduct."' 85 On the other hand, isolated in-
stances of police misconduct will not justify injunctive relief.'86 Finally, a
federal court may enter declaratory relief on the constitutionality of a
state statute without any showing of bad-faith or other special circum-
stances. 187 Because of these ways around the Younger doctrine, and be-
cause of the persistence of official attempts to suppress legitimate
activities, including political dissent, suits aimed at deterring law enforce-
ment from exceeding appropriate bounds continue to persist.
X. THE MEANING OF THE 'UNDER COLOR' OF LAW REQUIREMENT
OF § 1983
Before any liability can attach under § 1983, the act must occur "under
color" of law.' 8 8 This phrase includes actions by territories or the District
of Columbia.189 Liability under § 1983, however, does not include the
federal government or Indian tribal governments; 190 neither action is
promulgated in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.19'
15, 27 (D.D.C. 1990) (enjoining multiple prosecutions until case was resolved on the mer-
its). Cf. Fitts v. Kolb, 779 F. Supp. 1502, 1516 n.47 (D.S.C. 1991) (withdrawing injunctive
relief request after state criminal libel statute was held unconstitutional).
182. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974) (holding that threatened
prosecution, as opposed to prosecution that was pending, did not preclude declaratory re-
lief in a federal court action, even in the absence of bad faith enforcement or other special
circumstances).
183. 416 U.S. 802, 817 (1974).
184. See id at 814.
185. Id. at 815.
186. Id.
187. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 483-84.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Theresa R. Wilson, Nations Without a Nation: The Evolution of Tribal
Immunity, 24 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 99, 109-10 (1999-2000) (illustrating Congress' intent to
intentionally continue to immunize tribal nations).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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As we have seen, the "under color of law" requirement was narrowly
construed by nineteenth century courts. Monroe expanded this concept
by holding that officials acting illegally may yet be acting under color of
law.192 It remained to be seen whether, and under what circumstances,
private citizens could be liable under § 1983.
One can see a close parallel between state actors proceeding under
color of state law and state action required under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause only prohibits
states-not other entities or people-from denying citizens due process
of law.'9 3 The Supreme Court during Reconstruction had held that a
purely private citizen, acting without any state assistance, cannot violate
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause-there must, at least in
some sense, be state action. 194 This requirement continues to be strictly
enforced.' 95 Similarly, liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is triggered only
upon action that is under color of state law. 1 96 Both sections then raise
the issue of when and under what circumstances a private citizen's actions
become so bound up with state action (or are under color of state law)
that liability is triggered. Would the very narrow nineteenth century limi-
tations continue, or would some slight expansion occur?
The Civil Rights era again supplied the change in legal thought. Be-
cause of its outrageous facts, United States v. Price'97 is one of the most
important and famous cases to come out of the civil rights movement.
Mississippi law enforcement officers, in concert with members of the Ku
Klux Klan, kidnapped and murdered three civil rights workers. 98 Their
bodies, which had been buried in an earthen dam, were not found until
192. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
193. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1875).
194. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554-55. In Cruikshank, the Supreme Court limited the
ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment to state actions not involving one citizen against an-
other. Id. at 542. The Court also interpreted the equal protection clause similarly in Vir-
ginia v. Rives, as it stated:
The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution... all have refer-
ence to State action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals. It is the
State which is prohibited from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, and consequently the statutes partially enumerating what civil
rights colored men shall enjoy equally with white persons, founded as they are upon
the amendment, are intended for protection against State infringement of those rights.
100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880).
195. See, e.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
196. See supra Part IV.
197. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
198. Id. at 790.
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the F.B.I. paid a bribe to a local white male.1 99 National outrage fol-
lowed these brutal murders. State law enforcement, as it often happened
in civil rights crimes of that era in the South, was unable to successfully
prosecute.2°° Federal authorities ultimately prosecuted, and convicted
the defendants not for murder, but for the violation of the civil rights
workers' civil rights under 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 241.2 °1 At that time, a
violation of § 242 was a misdemeanor carrying a fine of up to $1,000 and
imprisonment for not more than one year or both. 02 Violation of § 241,
which prohibited conspiracies, constituted a felony carrying a fine of up
to $5,000 or imprisonment of up to 10 years or both. °3 Plainly, the viola-
tion of civil rights in that era constituted an inadequate but useful substi-
tute for a state's murder laws. Punishment in serious cases has since been
made significantly more severe.2z°
The District Court sustained the misdemeanor indictment under § 242
against the law enforcement officers (who were clearly acting under color
of state law as defined in Monroe), but dismissed the indictment as to the
private citizen participants, holding that their actions were not "under
color of law.",2 0 5 The Supreme Court reversed the ruling, holding that:
Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited
action, are acting "under color" of law for purposes of the statute.
199. Frederick Dennis Greene, Cultural Colonization in the Hollywood Film: The
Harlem Debates - Part 2, 5 ASIAN L.J. 63, 84 n.109 (1998); see also Clay S. Conrad, Sym-
posium, Juries: Arbiters or Arbitrary?: Redefining the Role of the Jury: Scapegoating The
Jury, 7 CORNELL J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 7, 34 (1997).
200. See Conrad, supra note 199, at 34.
201. Price, 383 U.S. at 791-807.
202. Id. at 791.
203. Id. at 796.
204. 18 U.S.C. § 242 now provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penal-
ties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than
are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or impris-
oned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts com-
mitted in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts
committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt
to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse,
or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years
or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000). Section 241 grants similar increases in penalties. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 (2000) (allowing a maximum penalty of death).
205. Price, 383 U.S. at 793.
2005]
THE SCHOLAR
To act "under color" of law does not require that the accused be an
officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in
joint activity with the State or its agents.2 °6
The District Court had also dismissed the conspiracy counts under
§ 241 on the ground that the statute did not include a person's rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 7 The Supreme Court reversed that
as well.208 The prosecution ultimately resulted in "the first successful jury
conviction of white officials and Klansmen in the history of Mississippi
for crimes against Negroes and civil rights workers., 209
Price's facts were so egregious (although hardly unusual for that era
where the murder of blacks by whites often went unpunished 210 ) that the
result seemed unsurprising. As the Court said:
[T]he brutal joint adventure was made possible by state detention
and calculated release of the prisoners by an officer of the State.
This action, clearly attributable to the State, was part of the mon-
strous design .... State officers participated in every phase of the
alleged venture: the release from jail, the interception, assault and
murder. It was a joint activity, from start to finish. Those who took
advantage of participation by state officers in accomplishment of the
foul purpose alleged must suffer the consequences of that participa-
tion. In effect, if the allegations are true, they were participants in
official lawlessness, acting in willful concert with state officers and
hence under color of law.2 1'
While Price was not a § 1983 case-it involved the current criminal
counterparts, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242-its rationale covers § 1983 as
well. Section 242 provided criminal penalties for the deprivation of fed-
erally protected rights under "color of any law, statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, or custom ... of any State., 212 Monroe had previously held "that
under 'color of law' has the same meaning in 18 U.S.C. § 242 as it does in
§ 1983. ",21 3 Hence, the holding in Price is directly relevant to § 1983 liti-
gation. Moreover, Price confirmed that the state action requirement of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the color of law requirements of 42
206. Id. at 794.
207. Id. at 797.
208. Id. at 805-06.
209. James P. Turner, Police Accountability in the Federal System, 30 McGEORGE L.
REv. 991, 1004 (1999) (citing 1967 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 185).
210. See, e.g., Conrad, supra note 199.
211. Price, 383 U.S. at 795 (emphasis added).
212. Id. at 791.
213. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 n.9 (1982) (citing Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 185 (1961)).
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U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § 242 are identical.214 Thus, cases interpret-
ing state action under the Fourteenth Amendment are directly relevant to
the color of law requirement under § 1983 and the terms "state actor" or
"state action" can be viewed as interchangeable with the phrase "under
color of law."
A side-note is worth considering. The officers plainly thought that they
would get away with it. The Southern criminal justice system rarely con-
victed a white person for killing a black person.215 It is every age's arro-
gance, when confronted with the atrocities of the past, to reason, "That
was then, those sorts of things do not happen now." We should know
better than to indulge this perennial conceit. Rodney King's assailants
did not expect videotaping and never expected prosecution.216
Because Price's facts were so exceptionally horrific, it remained to be
seen whether private citizens would be held to act under color of state
law in less horrific circumstances. The Supreme Court, in another civil
rights era case, answered affirmatively. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. in-
volved an apparently pretextual arrest under Mississippi's vagrancy
laws.21 7 Sandra Adickes, a white person, entered Kress' restaurant in the
company of six black students, all of whom attended Adickes "Freedom
School., 218 The students were offered service but Adickes was refused
service on the ground that she was a Caucasian "in the company of Ne-
groes." '219 Upon departing, Adickes was arrested on the charge of va-
grancy.220 Adickes filed a civil rights action under § 1983 alleging a
substantive violation of her Equal Protection Clause right not to be dis-
criminated against on the basis of her race, and alleging that the refusal to
serve her resulted from a conspiracy between the restaurant and the po-
lice.22' The Supreme Court found that such a conspiracy, if proven, con-
stituted joint activity under Price that would make both state actors.222
Moreover, the Court, in an extended discussion, held that, in order to
prove the substantive equal protection violation, Adickes needed only to
prove that Kress "refused her service because of a state-enforced custom
214. 383 U.S. at 797-98.
215. Conrad, supra note 199, at 10.
216. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 209, at 992 (explaining how the justice Department
became involved in the case after the state court acquitted the officers); id. at 998 (explain-
ing how jury nullification plays a part in racist decision-making from the civil rights cases to
Rodney King).
217. 398 U.S. 144, 146 (1970).
218. Id. at 146-47.
219. Id at 149.
220. Id. at 146.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 152.
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of segregating the races in public restaurants., 223 The case confirmed pri-
vate citizen exposure to civil rights laws and expanded the notion of
which customs have sufficient force of law to constitute state action.
XI. CONCLUSION
It may seem artificial to begin a history with Reconstruction and end it
with the Civil Rights Era. However many courts continue to change and
construe the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The history of its creation and its
massive expansion during the Civil Rights Era remains with us. For that
reason, it is crucial to have an understanding of that Act. One cannot
fully understand police and correctional officer liability without at least
some understanding of that history.
The Act began as an attempt to make the constitutional changes,
wrought by Reconstruction, effective. The Compromise of 1877 ended
that and sent the statute into, what at the time must have seemed, a per-
manent retirement. But the seeds of change had been sowed.
Before the 1960's state and local officials were effectively immune from
liability for even the worst misconduct. Subject only to regulation by the
individual states, flagrant brutality and other outright misconduct was
often ignored. The 1961 Monroe decision changed the landscape-fed-
eral liability, enforceable in a federal court, broadened accountability of
state and local officials.
Federal liability for local governmental wrongdoing has revolutionized
policing and corrections. It, for what had heretofore been a matter of
state law, is, in part, a consequence of application of constitutional rights
to criminal procedure and to jails and prisons. Throughout the 1960's the
Supreme Court applied more and more of the protections of the Bill of
Rights to state criminal prosecutions. Jails and prisons likewise came
under constitutional scrutiny. Thus, constitutional restrictions increas-
ingly restrained and regulated discretionary police and corrections of-
ficers' conduct. Despite some recent narrowing, these changes continue
to regulate official misconduct and will remain important for the foresee-
able future.
223. Id. at 171.
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